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1  Introduction and objectives: 
This article shall concentrate on determining the degree to which it is possible to 
state that contagion arose from the financial events which occurred from the mid-1990s 
onwards. A  series of  simultaneous crises occurred, and given the synchronicity and 
intensity of the same, we may conjecture the existence of a breakdown in the traditional 
pattern of propagation of events. The crises hit a wide range of countries with such 
severity and simultaneity that the suggestion of a more systemic pattern to these crises is 
a hypothesis that arises almost immediately.
3 
A brief historical summary shows that over a decade, some eight major events 
with  significant  repercussions  on  markets  may  be  listed:  a)  the  devaluation  of  the 
Mexican Peso in December 1994; b) the devaluation of the Thai Baht in July 1997; c) 
the collapse of Russia in August 1998; d) the recapitalisation of LTCM in September 
1998;  e)  the  collapse  of  the  Hong  Kong  stock  market  in  October  1998;  f)  the 
devaluation of the Brazilian  Real  in  January 1999; g) the collapse of the  Argentine 
currency board in December 2001 and h) the pre-electoral panic in Brazil in the second 
half of 2002. 
The precise definition of contagion is an open question in the literature and a 
consensus remains to be reached. In this way, not only there is no consensus on the 
definition of contagion, but also there  is  no correct methodology  for testing  for the 
existence of contagion. This article is organised in the following way. In Section 2, we 
present the definitions of contagion present in the literature. In Section 3 we present a 
review of empirical studies. In Section 4, we present the econometric procedures. In 
Section 5, we describe the database. In Section  6, the principal results obtained are 
presented and discussed. Finally, we present our conclusions.  
2  Theoretical Benchmark: 
The complexity of crises and their consequences result from the multiplicity of 
causes and the interaction of the various mechanisms of propagation in time and in 
space.  This  is  aggravated  by  the  difference  between  countries  due  to the  degree  of 
institutional, economic and political development and the absence of mechanisms for 
international economic coordination. In this sense, a study of the crisis should begin by 
concentrating  on  a  specific  crisis  and  its  consequences.  This  does  not  imply  the 
impossibility of creating a theory on crises and contagion, so much as the existence of a 
multiplicity of models for explaining such phenomena.  
It  may  be  stated  that  the  literature  on  contagion  begins  with  the  models  of 
currency crises. In generic terms, these are split into three generations of models. The 
first  model  by  Krugman (1979) explains a currency  crisis  in the context of a  fixed 
exchange rate regime. The crisis occurs in the balance of payments due to a speculative 
attack against the fixed exchange rate with the exhaustion of reserves, thus altering the 
                                                 
3    This work does not aim to compare the gains from financial globalisation with the losses arising 
from contagion. Contagion brings economic losses  for countries and their populations. In this sense, 
autarchic  countries  are  less  susceptible  to  becoming  victims  of  contagion.  At  the  same  time,  while 
countries may be relatively closed in terms of world trade, they may be exposed or vulnerable to crises by 
virtue of external debt, as occurred in Latin America during the 1980s. currency regime. The rationality of agents and the macroeconomic fundamentals are 
relevant characteristics of this model, but the possibility of contagion does not exist. 
The second model by Flood and Garber (1984) and Obstfeld (1984) and Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995), considers the existence of multiple equilibria. The belief of economic 
agents  directed  by  irrelevant  variables  (sunspots),  which  are  transformed  into  self-
fulfilling expectations during the crisis, implies multiple equilibria. The rationality of 
agents  and  the  macroeconomic  fundamentals  (the  inconsistency  between  short-  and 
long-term government policies) continue to be relevant characteristics of this model, 
although  the  possibility  of  contagion  exists.  The  third  model  by  Krugman  (1998) 
explains the exchange rate crisis in terms of the existence of speculative bubbles and 
moral risk. The first two generations of models are inadequate for explaining the crises 
which began during the 1990s.  
Crises and contagion are not exclusively characteristic of emerging countries. As 
an example, we may cite the crisis of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992, conceived 
as  a  currency  stabilisation  mechanism  for  a  number  of  European  countries,  when 
countries such as the UK, Portugal and Spain among others suffered speculative attacks. 
With  the  liberation  of  credit  in  1985  and  1986,  Norway  suffered  an  asset  bubble 
process.  At  the  end  of  the  1980s,  Japan  also  implemented  a  financial  liberalisation 
process, with an expansion of credit and a bubble in real assets.  
Allen and Gale (2004a) define crises as a sharp fall in asset prices which affects 
the solvency of banks and their ability to meet their commitments to their clients. Hong 
and Stein (1999), referring to the equity  market, define crises (crash) as  a strongly 
negative  change  in  share  prices,  unrelated  to  public  information  on  recent  events, 
implying contagion, i.e. it affects not only one asset but a set of assets. The 1990s were 
replete with financial crises which especially affected emerging countries, such as: the 
Mexico crisis (Tequila crises) in 1994/95, the Asian crisis (Asia flu) in 1997 and the 
Russian crisis (Russian virus) in 1998. Less severe for other emerging markets, we may 
cite the devaluation of the Brazilian currency in 1999, and the abandoning of the parity 
of  the  Argentine  Peso  against  the  U.S.  dollar  in  2001/02.  Financial  crises  may  be 
considered to be banking  crises, currency crises  (balance of payments), twin crises 
(bank and currency crisis) and bubbles. In principle, crises originating from an increase 
in international interest rates or the reduction in international commodity prices may be 
excluded from such events. Allen and Gale (2004b) defined financial vulnerability as 
being disproportionate effects which result in the insolvency of agents and the volatility 
of asset prices due to small aggregate shocks in demand for liquidity. Kaminsky and 
Reinhart  (1999)  analysed  crises  in  20  countries,  including  15  emerging  ones  and 
identified financial liberalisation and credit expansion as their common precursors. The 
evidence from the last decade seems to indicate that financial systems that are more 
market-oriented  are  more  susceptible  to  periodic  crises  following  commercial 
liberalisation and especially after financial globalisation.  
Financial globalisation is the result of the reduction in controls and the increase 
in mobility of capital for a set of countries. Financial integration in turn is a part of 
globalisation  and  refers  to  the  insertion  of  a  country  into  the  international  capital 
markets. Globalisation has carried with itself the increase in extension and profundity of 
global trade flows and financial flows to various countries, regardless of whether they 
have good or bad macroeconomic fundamentals. Schmukler, Zoido and Halac (2004) point out that the benefits for the receiving 
country  are  a)  access  to  new  sources  of  funds,  b)  greater  supply  of  these,  c)  an 
improvement  in  the  financial  infrastructure,  mitigating  information  asymmetry  and 
reducing  problems  of  adverse  selection  and  moral  risk,  d)  an  increase  in  financial 
efficiency  due  to  the  competition  of  local  banks  with  international  ones.  Bekaert, 
Harvey and Lundlad (2003) estimated that the liberalisation of capital markets raised 
real  annual  per  capita  income  by  around  1%  for  five  years.  At  the  same  time,  the 
intensification of commercial and financial relations also carries risk sharing with it. 
Allen and Gale (2004b) demonstrated theoretically that small shocks which impact the 
demand for liquidity may increase price volatility, bank insolvency or both. Bekaert, 
Harvey and Lundlad (2003) showed empirically that financial liberalisation reduces the 
volatility  of  growth  in  consumption  but  increases  the  volatility  of  GDP  growth  in 
emerging countries. Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003) mention that it is difficult to 
establish a strong causal relationship between financial integration and growth, since 
there is still no robust and clear empirical proof that is quantitatively significant. At the 
same time, for the same authors there is a “threshold” effect, for which the benefits are 
greater in emerging countries with more consistent macroeconomic policies, which, in a 
stable institutional environment, improve governance conditions, attracting less volatile 
capital and reducing vulnerability to external crises. The specificity of the country, in 
macroeconomic and institutional terms, appears to be the essential condition for benefits 
to occur, with Chile forming an example of this (Edwards (2005)). 
As a consequence of the crisis, there was a reduction in economic activity in one 
or more countries. As a consequence of the  shocks, there was: a reduction  in asset 
prices; a reduction in liquidity, an increase in financing and fund raising costs in the 
international market or even a lack of access to the international capital market. With 
the eruption of the crises, the imperfections of the international financial system, the 
fragilities and vulnerability of the countries involved becomes evident.  
It is thus in this context of financial globalisation that from 1997 onwards, the 
concept of contagion appears. Allen and Gale (2007) affirms that the classical theory of 
risk considers this to be exogenous, i.e. associated with conditions of nature, although 
what is observed is that the risks associated with globalisation is endogenous, i.e. they 
result from its own dynamics. There is no consensus on the concept and measure of 
contagion,  but  it  may  initially  be  stated  that  the  term  expresses  the  international 
transmission of financial crises. While this study focuses on the 1990s, crisis episodes 
are not a recent phenomenon. Bordo and Murshid (2000) and Kaminsky, Reinhart and 
Végh  (2002)  describe  financial  crises  which  began  in  1825.  Kindelberger  (1989) 
presents a chronology of crises starting in the 17th century. 
2.1  Interdependence (Spillover and Monsoon) and Contagion: 
   Masson (1998) analysing the Mexican and Asian crises, distinguishes three non-
exclusive characteristics which explain the simultaneous nature of the crises in time. 1) 
Firstly,  the  crises  may  be  the  result  of  a  common  factor,  such  as  economic  policy 
decisions  taken  by  a  developed  country  with  macroeconomic  effects  in  emerging 
markets. An example of this would be the interest rate crises, Black September of 1982. 
2)  Secondly,  crises  in  emerging  markets  affecting  macroeconomic  fundamentals  in 
other  emerging  markets,  such  as  exchange  rate  devaluation  or  a  liquidity  crisis.  3) 
Thirdly, the emergence of a crisis in a given country may trigger a crisis in another country,  without  any  relationship  to  the  macroeconomic  fundamentals  of  the  latter, 
perhaps as a function of the change in market sentiment or in the evaluation of existing 
information. The  first characteristic was termed the  monsoon effect  by Masson and 
Mussa (1995). The second characteristic was termed spillover by Calvo and Reinhart 
(1996),  while  the  third  was  termed  pure  contagion  by  Sachs,  Tornell  and  Velasco 
(1996), for which changes in the expectations of economic agents are not related to the 
change in fundamentals of the country in question. Masson (1999) characterised this as 
“market sentiment”, for which the expression in the economic literature is “sunspots”, 
i.e. irrelevant variables which direct the expectations of agents. In this category, the 
explanation of crises is related to the existence of multiple equilibria and self-realising 
expectations. As such, the first and second characteristics may be classified as being 
related to fundamentals and the third as unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals. The 
first two, monsoon and  spill-over, are termed  interdependence (Forbes and  Rigobon 
(2002) and Pesaran and Pick (2003)) 
Goldstein and Hawkins (1998) recall the fact that two important rating agencies 
did not succeed in monitoring the latent risks in the Asian crisis. At the same time, on 
analysing 18 measures of fundamentals considered important in the literature, the two 
countries  indicated  as  the  most  vulnerable  were  indeed  the  most  severely  affected, 
namely Thailand and Indonesia.  
Dornbush, Park and Claessens (2000) adopt the definition of contagion as being 
the dissemination of market disturbances, most of the time with negative consequences, 
from one emerging  market to another, observed through co-movements in exchange 
rates, share prices, sovereign risk spreads and capital flows.  
Pritsker (2001) defined contagion as the occurrence of a shock in one or more 
markets, countries or institutions that spread to other markets, countries or institutions. 
This  definition  of  contagion  is  equivalent  to the  definition  of  spillover.  The  author 
distinguished between rational and irrational contagion. In the latter case, the shock is 
transmitted between countries as the result of market participants who follow portfolio 
strategies which ex ante are not rational, i.e. agents do not maximise utility, given the 
environment and behaviour of other agents. The existence of multiple equilibria differs 
from irrational contagion, in so far as in the former, the agents act rationally in each 
equilibrium situation, whether good or bad. 
Pericoli and Sbracia (2001) list five definitions of contagion, namely: 1) when 
there is an increased probability of crisis in a country, given the existence of a crisis in 
another country; 2) when volatility is propagated as a proxy for uncertainty from the 
crisis  of  a  country  to the  financial  markets  of  other  countries;  3)  when  there  is  an 
increase in co-movements in prices and quantities between markets, given the crises in 
one or  more  markets; 4)  when there  is a change  in the transmission  mechanism or 
channel for contagion, with the intensification of the same after the crisis and 5) when 
there are co-movements that are not explained by the fundamentals. According to the 
authors this implies two major theoretical groups, discriminated by whether or not there 
is a structural breakdown in the relationship between markets given the crisis. At the 
same  time,  from  an  empirical  point  of  view,  the  determination  of  this  breakdown 
remains highly controversial. 
Forbes  and  Rigobon  (2002),  in  line  with  Masson  (1998)  consider  three 
mechanisms  for  the  propagation  of  crises:  1)  aggregate  shocks  which  affect  the economic fundamentals of more than one country; 2) shocks in specific countries which 
affect the fundamentals of other countries and 3) shocks which are not explained by 
fundamentals and which they termed pure contagion. In the last case of pure contagion, 
the  reasons  may  be:  a)  multiple  equilibria  as  a  function  of  the  alteration  in  the 
expectations of investors; b) liquidity shocks in which the agents divest their assets in 
countries as a function of the crisis in another country; c) investor psychology in which 
investors, given a crisis in a country, associate it with previous crises, with a correlation 
of  memories  and  not  of  fundamentals;    d)  results  of  economic  policies  which  are 
intertemporally inconsistent. In all of these situations, there will be co-movements of 
share  prices  of  the  countries  affected  by  the  propagation  of  crises.  They  defined 
contagion as the increase in the probability of a crisis in a country, given that there has 
been  a  crisis  in  another  country,  discounting  the  effects  of  interdependence  or 
fundamentals,  i.e.  the  contagion  refers  to  the  residual  character  of  the  crisis  which 
befalls countries  in  an unpredictable way. These authors analysed the  impact of the 
Asian and Mexican crises and the 1987 crash of the New York Stock Exchange on the 
equity markets of emerging and developed countries and concluded that most of the 
changes were due to interdependence and that contagion increased the co-movement of 
prices during the propagation of crises. 
There are important practical implications in the distinction between contagion 
and interdependence, as was highlighted by Pesaran and Pick (2003). If there is a high 
degree of correlation between markets after negative shocks, portfolio diversification 
may be of little effect. If there is a shift from a good equilibrium to a bad equilibrium as 
a function of market sentiment, the existence of an international lender of the last resort 
may reverse the equilibrium condition. At the same time, if there is a spillover effect 
which is aggravated by poor economic fundamentals, international aid mechanisms will 
be inadequate and will require conditionalities of countries. 
2.2  Vectors of Contagion: 
  The literature on the theoretical causes of financial crises, especially for equities, 
may  be  divided  into  three  categories:  1)  the  herd  behaviour  of  the  investor;  2) 
endogenous  liquidity  shocks  and  3)  multiple  equilibria.  Calvo  and  Mendoza  (1998) 
describe two contagion mechanisms which provide incentives for herd behaviour: 1) if 
the relative weighting of shares in companies of a given country is relatively small in 
relation to the overall portfolio and the relative loss resulting from a shock is less than 
the cost of obtaining information, 2) if the marginal cost of being “led” by the market is 
less than the cost of reversing the process. Valdés (1997) and Goldfajn  and Valdés 
(1997) consider that the reduction in liquidity of a country may cause the investor to 
divest his positions in other countries in order to meet his commitments (e.g. margin 
calls). Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) highlight the importance of the existence of a 
major creditor, i.e. a bank or investors with significant amounts invested in a country, 
not only in terms of its investment or loan portfolio, but which is also relevant in terms 
of the local market.   
Kodres and Pritsker (2002) considered that the  rebalancing of portfolios and 
information asymmetry generated by this behaviour in other countries and markets may 
cause contagion. Masson (1998) considers the existence of multiple equilibria where a 
crisis  in a given  country  may  be a  sunspot in another crisis, triggering a crisis and 
generating a bad equilibrium. Calvo and Reinhart (1996), evaluating resource flows to Latin America during 
the Mexican crisis, listed six sources of contagion: 1) when two neighbouring countries 
have a highly integrated capital markets; 2) when there are relatively significant foreign 
trade flows between countries; 3) when major institutional investors are present who 
divest their positions in emerging markets, with narrow and illiquid markets, causing a 
sharp and generalised fall in the prices of these assets; 4) when foreign investors transfer 
their resources from emerging markets to more accessible or reliable markets; 5) when 
technological factors related to local industry affect a country’s growth or when there is 
political  instability; 6) when there  is a  ‘bandwagon’ effect, i.e. when the change  in 
expectations  or  sentiment  of  agents,  even  if  unrelated  to  fundamentals,  causes  the 
grouping or convergence of self-realising expectations. 
Analysing  the  Asian  crisis,  Radelet  and  Sachs  (1998)  identify  five  types  of 
financial crisis: 1) A crisis induced by macroeconomic policies (currency depreciation, 
loss of international reserves, collapse of a fixed exchange rate), taking Krugman (1979) 
model as an example; 2) financial panics, implying the existence of multiple equilibria, 
taking  as  example  the  model  of  Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983);  3)  the  collapse  of 
speculative bubbles, taking as example, the model of Blanchard and Watson (1982); 4) 
moral risk, implying the collapse of financial institutions with an implicit or explicit 
guarantee, taking as an example the model of Akerlof, Romer and Looting (1994); 5) a 
disordered race to borrow in situations of insolvency or illiquidity, taking as example 
the model of Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996).  
Analysing the Mexican and Asian crises, Lovell, Neu and Tong (1998) listed the 
coincidence of shocks affecting the financial conditions of a country, a common shock 
affecting  fundamentals  between countries and  financial  contagion that would  be the 
transmission of international financial crises as possible explanations for the crises. The 
authors identify 4  models of contagion: 1) the economic  linkage  model,  in which  a 
financial crisis in one country provokes a series of crises in other countries, altering 
their  economic  fundamentals,  e.g.  Gerlach  and  Smets  (1995);  2)  the  Heightened 
Awareness  Model,  in  which  due  to  lack  of  information,  investors  concentrate  their 
investments  in  a  small  number  of  countries  and  when  the  crises  occur  in  a  given 
country, they divest their positions in other countries with possible similar problems and 
poor  economic  fundamentals,  e.g.  Calvo  and  Reinhart  (1996)  3)  The  Portfolio 
Adjustment Model, in which leveraged investors honour their commitments in a given 
country by divest their investments in other countries, causing a financial crisis in these 
latter, e.g. Garber and Lall (1996) and 4) The Herd Behaviour Model, in which investors 
divest their  investments  in one or  more countries that do not necessarily  have poor 
fundamentals, due to the similar behaviour of other examples, e.g. Wolf (1997).  
Goldstein and Hawkins (1998) considered that there were three causes of the 
Asian financial crisis, with regard to Thailand in 1997: 1) vulnerabilities of the financial 
sector  (credit  boom,  speculative  property  bubble,  high  short-term  debt  within  the 
country, low level of international reserves); 2) problems with the external sector (poor 
quality  of  investment,  high  real  exchange  rate,  fall  in  export  revenues,  intense 
competition with China and excessive production and competition in certain industries 
with  regard  to  other  Asian  countries)  and  3)  contagion.  The  author  mentions  the 
following  sources  of  contagion:  1)  direct  linkage  to  other  countries;  2)  competitive 
devaluation by competitors, subjecting the countries to a speculative attack in the event 
that the devaluation of its currency did not accompany the others and 3) signalling, i.e. as a function of the problem in Thailand, investors re-evaluated their investments in 
similar  countries  and  reallocated  their  resources  or  where  possible,  anticipated  loan 
maturities. 
Perry and Lederman (1998) analysed the impacts of the Asian crisis on Latin 
America,  separating  the  causes  and  the  symptoms  of  Latin  American  financial 
vulnerability and its consequences. They defined financial vulnerability as being a high 
probability of a successful speculative attack on national currencies. Different causes 
may imply the same kind of symptom. As causes, they listed the following: 1) rigid 
currency regimes, 2) moral risk in the banking system and among large corporations 
causing abundant credit and bubbles in the prices of real and financial assets, resulting 
in insolvency, after the bursting of the bubble; 3) a lack of transparency of transactions 
combined  with  a  defective  or  non-existent  governance  structure,  especially  in  large 
family-owned  companies;  4)  a  lack  of  supervision  and  regulation  of  banks  and 
companies,  resulted  in  a  low  level  of  legal  and  market  discipline;  5)  financial  and 
capital account liberalisation which fed credit expansion, asset bubbles and currency 
exposure.  The  symptoms  of  these  causes  which  caused  the  insolvency  of  financial 
intermediaries, the liquidity crisis and the fall in reserves were: 1) vulnerability of the 
external sector (appreciation of the real exchange rate, a fall in export growth and high 
and growing current account deficits); 2) the risks of debt rollover (heavy short-term 
maturities of long-term debt relative to reserves); 3) uninsured currency risk of large 
international borrowers (a potential devaluation would have a severe impact on foreign 
currency borrowers, such as  banks and  large  importers; 4) vulnerability of  banks to 
increases  in  interest rates with a reduction  in economic activity on account of their 
debts.  
Perry and  Lederman (1998) also considered that contagion  leads to financial 
vulnerability, albeit that the same does not occur with spillover. The authors cited two 
types  of  effects  of  contagion  of  the  Asian  crisis  in  particular  for  Latin  America; 
financial  and  real  (non-financial).  The  financial  effects  consist  of:  1)  information 
shocks, where investors, due to the lack of information, evaluate the conditions of one 
country on the basis of a crisis in another similar country, with two consequences: a) 
flight to safety and b) a demonstration effect; 2) the effect of institutional investors 
liquidating investments in countries which have not yet suffered the effects of the crisis. 
The non-financial or real effects consist of: 1) a contraction in economic activity and 2) 
export substitution, which compromise the competitiveness of countries. 
Using  panel  data  of  the  last  30  years  for  20  industrialised  countries, 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) found evidence that trade relationships between 
countries  facilitated  contagion  in  a  currency  crisis.  Glick  and  Rose  (1998)  found 
empirical evidence of a regional character for currency crises as a result of trade links 
between  neighbouring  countries.  At  the  same  time,  Calvo  and  Reinhart  (1996) 
emphasised the sudden interruption of capital flows (sudden stop problem) as a result of 
banks or rent-seekers with short-term contracts refusing to roll over the short-term debt 
of emerging countries. According to Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) and Calvo and 
Talvi (2005), in the case of Argentina, which had a closed economy, highly dollarised 
liabilities and a lack of fiscal discipline, the sudden stop had catastrophic effects, unlike 
the case in Chile.  Frankel and Schmukler (1998) and Kaminsky, Lyons and Reinhart (2001) found 
evidence that U.S. mutual funds played a significant role in spreading the crisis in Latin 
America, due to the sake of their positions in a search for greater liquidity and security. 
Kaminsky,  Lyons  and  Reinhart  (2001)  examined  the  relevant  role  of  the  Japanese 
commercial banks in propagating the Asian crisis throughout the countries of the region. 
Berg and Patillo (1998), testing predictive models for the Asian crisis on the 
basis of a set of fundamentals as explanatory variables, found evidence that only one of 
the three models analysed was capable of predicting the currency crisis in a modest 
way.  
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) analysed contagion on the basis of fundamentals 
in twenty countries during the period 1970 to 1998, emphasising the role of commercial 
and financial relations between countries. The evidence suggests that contagion: 1) has 
historically been more regional than global; 2) is highly non-linear, i.e. the probability 
of a crisis in a given country increases if there is a group of “infected” countries; 3) 
there  is  a  difficulty  in  distinguishing  between  channels  of  transmission  involving 
commercial or financial relationships; 4) in some cases, financial transmission channels  
are more significant than commercial ones, as was the case, for example, of Argentina 
during the Mexican crisis. 
Frankel and Schmukler (1998) analysed the spillover of the Mexican crisis in 
relation to Latin America and Asia, in relation to investment funds and concluded that: 
1)  fund  movements  impacted  the  value  of  other  investment  funds  in  local  Latin 
American markets and 3) countries with “poor” fundamentals were the worst affected 
by movements in investment funds.  
Dornbush,  Park  and  Claessens  (2000)  reviewed  the  literature  on  contagion, 
highlighting a number of points that until then had been little explored. They list as the 
fundamental  causes  of  contagion  and  transmission  vectors:  1)  those  related  to 
fundamentals, such as: a) common shocks, e.g. changes in U.S. interest rates which 
determined  capital  flows  to  Latin  America  (Calvo  and  Reinhart  (1996));  b)  trade 
relations and competitive devaluation, e.g. Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) and c) 
international  financial  relationships;  2)  those  unrelated  to  fundamentals,  referring 
exclusively to the behaviour of investors, in function of a) restrictions on liquidity and 
incentive  problems,  b)  asymmetric  coordination  and  information  problems,  c)  the 
existence of multiple equilibria and d) a change in the rules of the game. 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2002) used the term “holy trinity of crisis” to 
refer to three common characteristics of contagion, described as a rapid and violent 
shock, as opposed to spillover or death by a thousand cuts.: 1) a sudden stop, 2) the 
surprise effect and 3) the presence of a large provider of capital. Analysing data for 163 
countries for the period 1970-2000, Edwards (2005) found no evidence to suggest that 
countries with high capital mobility had a higher incidence of crises than countries with 
lower capital mobility. At the same time, given the crisis, countries with higher capital 
mobility had higher costs in terms of a reduction in product. 
This article shall analyse financial contagion through equity markets, given that 
most empirical studies which test whether contagion or interdependence existed use the 
equity markets of different countries. This is due to the fact that the majority of stock 
exchanges  are  organised  markets  which  have  an  impact  on  the  volatility  of  other markets (fixed income and currency) which is larger than that of the latter on equity 
markets. 
3  Empirical Benchmark for Equity Markets: 
   Despite relatively extensive empirical literature on contagion in equity markets, 
the empirical results are divergent.  
   Baig and Goldfajn (1998) considered daily exchange rate, interest rate, spreads 
on external debt securities and stock indices for Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, South 
Korea  and  the  Philippines.  In  relation  to the  original  correlation  coefficient  for the 
spreads, interest and exchange rates, they noted the presence of contagion. With regard 
to  the  correlation  coefficient  obtained  by  regression  with  controls  for  fundamentals 
(stock indices and exchange rates) and dummies for good and bad news, with the above 
series as dependent variables, the authors noted that there was contagion between equity 
and currency markets. 
   Baig and Goldfajn (2000) examined whether there was contagion during the 
Russian crisis with regard to Brazil through spreads on Brady bonds and stock indices, 
using  Forbes  and  Rigobon  (2002)  adjusted  correlation  coefficient.  The  authors 
concluded that contagion occurred and that the mechanism of propagation was the debt 
securities  market. They also noted the sudden  halt  in capital  flows to Brazil and to 
Russia.   
   Forbes and Rigobon (2002) analysed the impact of the Asian and Mexican crises 
and the 1987 crash of the New York stock exchange on the equity markets of emerging 
and developed countries, and concluded, with adjusted correlation tests, that most of the 
changes (16 out of 17 countries) were due to interdependence. The high degree of co-
movements  of  markets  during  the  crises  was  due  to  the  intensification  of  the 
relationship between markets since the unadjusted correlation would be a function of the 
variance which increased during the crises. 
   Corsetti,  Pericoli  and  Sbracia  (2005)  used  a  factor  model  to  estimate  equity 
returns during the Asian crisis, checking the relationship between returns from the Hong 
Kong stock exchange, and the stock markets for 10 emerging countries and the G7 
countries. Contagion is a structural breakdown in the mechanisms for transmission of 
shocks, considering a) the correlation between markets due to common factors and b) 
the variance of returns in the country in which the crisis originated. According to the 
authors, the works which concluded in favour of evidence of interdependence made 
unrealistic and arbitrary assumptions on the variances of countries during the crises. The 
evidence  suggested  that  in  at  least  5  of  the  17  countries,  there  was  evidence  of 
contagion, so that there would be both contagion and interdependence. 
   Chiang, Jeon and Li (2007) applied the dynamic correlation model (DCC) to 9 
Asian countries for the period 1990-2003. According to these authors, the modelling 
used  considers  a  series  of  restrictions  imposed  by  the  literature,  namely: 
heteoscedasticity, omission of the relevant variable, the dynamic nature of correlations, 
the identification of the origin of the crisis and the period of autoregression and the bias 
in selecting periods of tranquillity and crisis. The authors concluded with regard to the 
Asian crisis that: a) there was evidence of contagion;  b) the crisis consisted of two 
phases:  the  first,  in  which  contagion  occurred  due  to  investors  considering  local 
information, and a second, in which the state of alert of investors increased with more 
general  information,  generating  herd  behaviour;  c)  the  correlation  coefficient  was strongly related to the ratings by the agencies which observed the sovereign credit risk 
of the countries in question. 
   Rigobon (2003) applied the dynamic correlation model (DCC) to the countries 
involved  in  the  Mexican,  Asian  and  Russian  crises.  For  the  Mexican  crisis,  the 
mechanism  for  the  transmission  of  crises  remained  relatively  constant,  providing 
evidence of interdependence. At the same time, for the Russian crisis, and especially for 
the Asian crisis, there was evidence of a structural breakdown. Capital flows between 
countries tends to be highly volatile during crises, which may imply contagion. 
   Caporale,  Sipolini  and  Spagnolo  (2003),  in  line  with  Rigobon  (2003),  after 
adjusting  the  latter’s  model  (2001)  for  heteroscedasticity,  endogeneity  and  omitted 
variables, concluded that there was evidence of contagion during the Asian crisis. At the 
same  time,  Billio,  Lo  Duca  and  Pellizzon  (2003),  analysing  the  Asian  crisis  and 
applying  the  determinant  test  for  the  change  in  Rigobon  (2003)  covariance  matrix, 
concluded that this procedure is not adequate for detecting contagion, since a) there is a 
rejection  of  stability  when  there  is  a  change  in  the  parameter  or  a  violation  of  the 
hypothesis of heteroscedasticity and b) there is a loss of power of the test when several 
markets or countries are analysed. 
   Longin  and  Solnik  (2001)  used  the  theory  of  extreme  values  to  model  the 
multivariate distribution of tails of distributions  of returns  for the period 1958-1996 
using monthly data. They observed that negatively correlated returns above a certain 
level did not converge to zero with an increase in this level and that the hypothesis of 
multivariate normality of the same was not verified. The contrary occurred with positive 
correlations, i.e. these tended to zero with an increase in the level and had a normal 
multivariate distribution. This implied that correlations increased during crises but not 
during periods of tranquillity. 
   Bae,  Karolyi  and  Stulz  (2003)  used  the  theory  of  extreme  values  to  analyse 
contagion, since the phenomenon is non-linear. The authors considered the pre- and 
post-crisis periods for Mexico and Asia, concluding that: 1) contagion was more serious 
in Latin America than in Asia; 3) contagion from Latin America to other regions was 
more important than that originating in Asia; 3) the United States was not contaminated 
by the Asian crisis and 4) contagion is predictable, subject to prior information.  
   Dungey, Fry and Martin (2005) examined the empirical literature on contagion, 
considering the set of tests on currency, equity and fixed income markets. In the light of 
the articles that they examined, the authors observed that: 1) the relation between poor 
fundamentals and contagion is dubious, although countries with poor fundamentals are 
more susceptible to contagion, present higher costs and take longer to emerge from a 
crisis; 2) financial relationships are more important as contagion mechanisms than are 
trading links between countries; 3) regional proximity is important for the transmission 
of crises, considering not only trading but also financial relationships; 4) developing 
countries  are  more  susceptible  to  contagion,  although  developed  countries  are  not 
immune;  5)  financial  markets  in  developed  countries  may  be  significant  agents  for 
transmitting crises; 6) the effects of contagion are different as a function of the type of 
asset or market, with equity markets susceptible to much stronger effects than currency 
or fixed income markets; 7) the effects of contagion differ from country to country and 
by type of asset or market, e.g. currency shocks are responsible for 11% of the volatility 
in equity indices, while equity market shocks are responsible for 36% of the volatility of 
currency markets. Given this situation, the solutions to a crisis must consider the source 
of contagion and the mechanisms of propagation.    Boyer, Kumagai and Yuan (2005) analysed the impact of the Mexican, Asian 
and Russian crises on the equity markets of developed and emerging countries. The 
evidence  suggests  that  the  propagation  of  the  crisis  was  due  to  the  presence  of 
international  investors  in  the  equity  markets  of  different  countries.  Considering  two 
groups of shares, those owned by international investors and those not owned by them, 
and controlling for the effect of exchange rates, the authors observed contagion, i.e., 
when  international  investors  divested  their  positions,  they  contaminated  the  equity 
market as a whole. In developing countries, this was aggravated by the repositioning of 
local investors as a function of their losses, and in developed countries, this implied a 
rebalancing of portfolios. 
   Within  Brazil,  Lopes  and  Moura  (2001)  identified  speculation  and  external 
instability  as  the  principal  factors  in  speculative  attacks  on  the  Brazilian  currency 
between 1994 and 1999.  Castro and Leite (2003) estimated the probabilities of currency 
attacks  during  the  same  period  and  identified  the  elements  of  the  first  generation 
currency crisis model as relevant (fiscal situation of the public sector), albeit without 
discarding the elements of the second generation model. Prates (2005) drew up a critical 
review of conventional models of financial crises of the 1990s. In his doctoral thesis,  
Saraiva Leon (2002) applied the model of Cole and Kehoe (1996) to analyse speculative 
attacks on the Brazilian currency. Guidugli (2005) undertook a multivariate analysis, 
observing contagion during the speculative attack episode and currency crisis of 1998-
99 involving Brazil, Russia and Argentina, in relation to equities, interest rates and the 
risk spreads of international securities.  
4  Econometric Methodology: The Importance of Fundamentals in Modelling 
Contagion:  
Dungey,  Fry,  Gonzalez-Hermozillio  and  Martin  (2004)  start  from  an  initial 
model in the absence of contagion for the returns of the assets under analysis: 




















in which wit represents a term common to the two assets; uit are idiosyncratic shocks. 
The terms wt and uit are independent, as are uit and ujt for any i≠j. 
It may be demonstrated that: 
eq. 2: 
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Given that country 1 is in crisis and that there is contagion, this alters eq. 1 in the 
following way: 
eq. 3: 
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In this way, in the event that the analyst has the information about crisis times, it 
is possible to test the hypothesis of contagion, comparing the structure of correlations 
between  times.  “In  particular,  contagion  has  the  effect  of  causing  a  structural  shift 
during the crisis period in the conditional covariance (…) and in conditional variance 
(…).” Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermozillio and Martin (2004). Pesaran and Pick (2003) 
criticise this kind of approach on the basis of three arguments: i) the analyst is required 
to have a priori information on the moment of the crisis; ii) the duration of the crisis is 
not sufficiently great to allow comparisons of correlations, principally when there are 
more than two assets in question; iii) there is a selection bias in the sample, since crisis 
times are not known a priori.  
  Assume that the generating processes for the data described by the equations in 
the case of non-contagion (eq. 5) and contagion (eq. 6) are as follows:     
eq. 5: 
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in which y represents some indicator variable for crises, such as the returns on 
stock  indices,  the  change  in  the  prices  of  a  country’s  debt  securities  or  indices  of 
currency pressure (Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996)). Variable I() is an indicator 
with a value of unity when a negative shock of reasonable magnitude affects the asset 
under analysis and zero otherwise. In this way, this mechanism permits the propagation 
of volatility from a country by a mechanism that only operates in the presence of very 
strong negative shocks, altering the original structure of the model. This agrees with the 
literature  on  contagion,  which  views  the  concept  as  an  above  expected  correlation 
during  periods  of  tranquillity.  The  variable  z  consists  of  common  factors  which 
influence all assets, such as the oil price, international interest rates, etc. The variables xi 
contain  fundamentals  specific  to  the  country  with  the  property  of  explaining  the 
behaviour  of  the  variable  indicating  the  crisis  (y)  and  will  be  independent  of 
idiosyncratic shocks. The term sit denotes the standard deviation at time t of the term uit.  
In the literature on contagion, the evaluation of the evolution on contagion has 
been seen as an important indicator for the analysis of contagion. An extensive literature 
has devoted its attentions to evaluating which are the determinants of the correlations in 
the  case  where  contagion  exists.  After  an  intense  debate,  it  was  concluded  that the 
existence  of  contagion  cannot  be  considered  to  be  a  synonym  of  a  high  degree  of 
correlation, but as some kind of structural instability associated with crisis events, with 
the implementation of such tests remaining an open question. 
An extensive literature on modelling conditional volatility processes followed 
the original work of Engle (1982) and  Bollerslev (1986). The original  models were 
rapidly  generalised  to  multivariate  versions.  The  VEC  (Bollerslev,  Engle  and Wooldridge  (1988)),  BEKK  (Engle  and  Kroner  (1995))  and  factorial  (Lin  (1992)) 
models are three examples of this. While major obstacle had to be overcome in order for 
these models to become minimally operational, a major advance was recently made in 
the literature with the proposal of two models in the DCC-GARCH family by Engle 
(2002), Engle and Sheppard (2001) and Tse (2000) and  Tse and Tsui (2002). The great 
advantage of this model is that it has a rich structure in terms of generality and which is 
operationally easier to implement, even for a reasonable quantity of assets. 
Under the null hypothesis of non-contagion, a DCC-GARCH structure may be 
seen as an approximation to the process generating the data in the form given by eq. 5. 
Where contagion exists, a DCC-GARCH structure is not capable in principle of taking 
account of a process such as the one formulated above. At the same time, the DCC-
GARCH  model  must  have  some  specific  signals  of  misspecification.  In  eq.  6,  the 
existence of contagion implies that volatility was ‘exported’ from the country of origin 
which suffered the contagion and also with the correlations  when there was a negative 
shock of major proportions.
4  
  There  is  a  literature  on  specification  tests  which  allows  the  evaluation  and 
testing of sources of possible misspecification, such as residual heteroscedasticity, the 
effects of asymmetry in the variance and instability in conditional and unconditional 
structures.  These  tests  may  be  adapted  to  investigate  whether  the  source  of 
misspecification follows the pattern suggested in the case of contagion. The principal 
tests  used  in  the  literature  are those of  Wooldridge  (1990)  and  Wooldridge  (1991), 
applied by Engle and Sheppard (2001). Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermozillio and Martin 
(2004) review contagion tests. 
5  Multivariate Models of Volatility and Contagion and 
Description of the Database: 
On the basis of multivariate models of volatility, we may test for the existence of 
structural breakdowns in the structure of volatility propagation and whether these may 
be attributed to moments of crisis. This approach was implemented, e.g. by Marçal and 
Valls  Pereira  (2005)  and  Paula  (2006).  The  criticism  that  may  be  made  of  the 
methodology used in these studies is due to the non-correction of the fundamentals, 
which may bias the procedure in the direction of finding evidence for contagion, when 
this  does  not  actually  exist.  The  evidence  for  structural  alterations  may  be  due  to 
alterations  in the  fundamentals which cause returns or alterations of a  more general 
order, not foreseen by the same.  
We  collected  daily  stock  index  data  for  the  following  countries:  Argentina, 
Brazil,  South  Korea,  United  States,  Singapore,  Malaysia,  Mexico  and  Japan.  The 
frequency of the data is daily and for the period January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2003. 
The  sample  does  not  include  the  years  2004  and  2005  since  the  data  for  some 
fundamentals for certain countries were not available in the researched sources. Since 
we chose to work with the largest possible number of countries, these years were not 
included. The absence of Russia is justified not by the importance of the country but by 
                                                 
4    The investigation could also concentrate on positive shocks. In this case, it would be a question 
of ‘positive’ contagion, but this is not the object of this study. the fact that it was not possible to collect the fundamentals necessary for including this 
country in our analysis.  
Figure 1 presents an interesting pattern. In a non-rigorous way, it is possible to 
identify  a  period  of  joint  fall  in  all  the  indices  concentrated  during  the  highlighted 
period (from October of 1997 to June of 1999). Both before and afterwards, there is no 
defined pattern for all the equity markets, with the synchronised fall concentrated during 
the Asian and Russian crises. 
 



















   Figure 1: Various stock indices: 1994-2003 
   Source: The authors 
 
The fundamentals used are listed below in Table 1. Two principal sources were 
used: International Financial Statistics – IMF and the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) of the World Bank.  
 
Table 1: Fundamentals Used 
Daily  Fundamentals  –  FED  and 
National Central Banks: 
Monthly Fundamentals - IMF  Annual Fundamentals - WDI 
Oil price: Brent crude  Interbank interest rates  Growth in per capita GDP 
Nominal exchange rate for national 
currency against the dollar 
Export growth rate  Degree of openness 
  Monthly  and  accumulated  inflation 
during previous year 
Foreign Direct Investment as a % of 
GDP 
  Change in level of reserves  M2/Reserves 
    Current Account Deficit as a % of 
GDP 
    Interest Payments as a % of Exports    Source: The authors 
6  Description of Results: 
6.1  Do the fundamentals add explanatory power to the returns? 
Table 2 presents of the models estimated for stock index returns for the various 
countries. The model with fundamentals consists of a regression of returns against the 
variables  listed  above.  In  the  model  without  fundamentals,  we  exclude  all  models 
corresponding to fundamentals, with only the lagged returns remaining.
5 In general, the 
fundamentals used in the analysis add explanatory power to the returns. The exception 
is the United States, and to a lesser degree, Argentina. In the other countries, there is 




Table 2: Does Fundamentals really matter? Comparison of Models with and without Fundamentals 
Argentina Brazil South Korea USA Singapore Malaysia Mexico Japan
Model with Fundamentals * HQ -6,208 -6,101 -6,472 -7,736 -7,292 -7,126 -6,805 -7,085
SC -6,140 -6,073 -6,404 -7,675 -7,224 -7,057 -6,736 -7,017
AIK -6,248 -6,117 -6,512 -7,772 -7,332 -7,165 -6,844 -7,125
Model without  Fundamentals* HQ -6,236 -6,128 -6,454 -7,764 -7,291 -7,135 -6,793 -7,107
SC -6,209 -6,060 -6,512 -7,737 -7,263 -7,108 -6,765 -7,079
AIK -6,253 -6,168 -6,471 -7,781 -7,307 -7,151 -6,809 -7,123
Simplificação Statistics 35,01 139,82 122,54 19,50 91,58 70,64 111,19 47,26
Distribution c2(22) c c c c2(22) c c c c2(22) c2(22) c c c c2(22) c c c c2(22) c c c c2(22) c c c c2(22)
p-value 3,87% 0,00% 0,00% 36,18% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,14%
Argentina Brazil South Korea USA Singapore Malaysia Mexico Japan
Model with Fundamentals  ** HQ -6,206 -6,123 -6,470 -7,737 -7,300 -7,128 -6,801 -7,082
SC -6,134 -6,051 -6,397 -7,672 -7,228 -7,056 -6,729 -7,009
AIK -6,248 -6,165 -6,512 -7,774 -7,342 -7,170 -6,843 -7,124
Model without  Fundamentals** HQ -6,234 -6,092 -6,451 -7,766 -7,303 -7,139 -6,790 -7,104
SC -6,203 -6,055 -6,420 -7,735 -7,271 -7,107 -6,758 -7,072
AIK -6,253 -6,114 -6,469 -7,785 -7,321 -7,157 -6,808 -7,122
Restrictions Statistics 35,03 135,18 124,20 16,73 83,31 68,61 110,56 47,10
Distribution c2(22) c c c c2(22) c c c c2(22) c2(22) c c c c2(22) c c c c2(22) c c c c2(22) c c c c2(22)
p-value 3,84% 0,00% 0,00% 54,16% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,14%
* Models with GJR (1,1) heteroskedastic errors.
** Models with GJR (2,2) heteroskedastic errors.
Source: the authors
 
Following this, we collected the residuals from the regression for the returns on 
the fundamentals
7. These variables are used as a starting point for the volatility models. 
This two-stage procedure is used in this literature on account of the complexity of the 
models used, although this procedure is only fully satisfactory if the returns are normal, 
which does not appear to be the case. In addition, the volatility models assume that the 
                                                 
5 We also inserted dummy variables for each weekday and in order to distinguish returns calculated using 
data with a one-day interval from data with a greater interval.  
6 We also calculated t-statistics on the basis of variance estimators robust to heteroscedasticity, and there 
is good evidence that the fundamentals listed contain information to explain the analyzed returns. 
7 We tested whether there is residual autocorrelation in the squares of the residues of the regressions and 
it was not possible to reject the hypothesis of autocorrelation for the series. In this way, these may be used 
as the starting point for modeling the volatility structure and correlations on the basis of multivariate 
GARCH models. data are an innovation and do not show serial autocorrelation. This was tested for all 
countries and the results were satisfactory. 
6.2  Modelling the Volatility of Returns: 
  In modelling the volatility of returns, we used DCC-GARCH family  models. 
Four specifications were estimated: I) GARCH-DCC (1,1); II) GARCH-DCC (2,2); III) 
GARCH-DCC-GJR  (1,1)  and;  IV)  GARCH-DCC-GJR  (2,2).
8  Table  3  presents  the 
values  of  the  different  information  criteria.  The  DCC-GJR  models  show  better 
performance than the DCC models without asymmetry. We have a doubt as to whether 
to choose a model with one or two lags (DCC-11-GJR or DCC-22-GJR). Since all the 
models are nested, it is possible to carry out likelihood ratio tests. Table 4 presents the 
results of these tests and in this case, the preferred model is the DCC-22-GJR one. This 
model was utilised in the following analysis. 
 
Table 3: DCC versus DCC GJR – (Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle )– Choosing 
the best model 
SC HQ AIC
DCC-11 28.38      53861.45 26 1898 -56.653 -56.701 -56.729
DCC-22 28.39      53889.79 44 1898 -56.611 -56.692 -56.740
DCC-11-GJR 28.41      53921.80 29 1898 -56.704 -56.758 -56.789
DCC-22-GJR 28.43      53967.14 49 1898 -56.672 -56.763 -56.816
Source: the authors






Table 4: Comparing the estimated DCC’s – Likelihood ratio tests. 
Qui-Squared
p-value
DCC-22-GJR DCC-22 154,69 5 0,0000%
DCC-22-GJR DCC-11-GJR 90,67 20 0,0000%
DCC-22-GJR DCC-11 211,37 23 0,0000%
DCC-22 DCC-11 56,69 18 0,0007%
DCC-11-GJR DCC-11 120,70 3 0,0000%
Source: the authors




6.3  Did Contagion Genuinely Occur? 
In  this  section,  we  report the  results  of  the  specification  tests  to  investigate 
sources of instability in the basic model (DCC-22-GJR) which could be attributed to 
financial  crises.
9  It  is  necessary  to  construct  dummy  variables  for  sources  of 
misspecification.  For  the  definition  of  a  crisis  we  used  the  occurrence  of  negative 
shocks in returns which exceeded an absolute value of around 1.8 conditional standard 
                                                 
8   The GJR model was formulated in the article by Glosten, L.R., R. Jagannathan, and D. Runkle, 
1993, On The Relation Between The Expected Value And The Volatility Of The Normal Excess Return 
On Stocks, Journal Of Finance 48, 1779-1801. and permits the introduction of asymmetric effects into 
the volatility. 
9    All of the procedures carried out for the GARCH-DCC(2,2) model were done for a GARCH-
DCC(1,1) model with essentially similar results. deviations.
10 In this way, an indicator variable for each of the countries was constructed 
so that the candidate moments for the crisis were known. The indicator variables were 
constructed in the form suggested by the equations below: 
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in which ujt-1 represents the standard residue, e
2
jt-1 represents the square of the 
residue  of  the  country  equation  corrected  by  the  fundamentals  and  I  represents  an 
indicator variable with a value of unity when the residue is less than -1,8 and zero when 
it is not. The idea of the tests is to evaluate whether or not the estimated model under 
the null of no contagion has signs of misspecification suggested by eq. 6. The indicators 
functions were built up to evaluate whether or not there is evidence of misspecification 
suggested by contagion hypothesis as defined in section   4.  
A first order of tests was carried out to evaluate whether the described indicator 
variables for each country are sources of misspecification in the equations of the other 
countries. The rejection of the null hypothesis of the test implies initial evidence in 
favour of contagion, since there would be two patterns of unconditional volatility. The 
results are presented  in Table 5. There  are rejections of the  null  hypotheses, which 
observe  a  certain  pattern.  There  is  no  evidence  that  high  intensity  negative  shocks 
represented  by  the  indicator  variables  for  Brazil,  Mexico,  Singapore,  Japan  and  the 
United States caused changes in the conditional volatility pattern of the other countries. 
In the case of  Malaysia, the shocks  altered the  volatility pattern  for Mexico, South 
Korea and Argentina. In the case of South Korea, the countries affected were Brazil, 
Argentina  and  Singapore.  These  results  suggest  that  the  Asian  crisis  had  perhaps 
generated  more  of  a  contagion  effect  than  the  Latin  American  crises.  The  negative 
shocks  in  the  Mexican,  Brazilian  and  Argentine  markets  do  not  appear  to  have 
generated  significant  repercussions  in  terms  of  structural  alterations  in  the  other 
countries.  
 
Table 5: DCC – 22 – Is there evidence of changing in the volatility pattern? 
c2(4)
Used Indicator:  M1 to M4.
Estatística p-valor Estatística p-valor Estatística p-valor Estatística p-valor Estatística p-valor Estatísticap-valor Estatística p-valor Estatística p-valor
Mexico 1,79 77,42% 4,66 32,39% 22,35 0,02% ** 4,75 31,39% 2,55 63,61% 3,79 43,49% 6,27 17,97% 1,62 80,46%
Brazil 1,54 81,88% 9,24 5,54% 2,90 57,40% 8,62 7,14% a 3,27 51,44% 1,89 75,64% 3,76 43,91% 5,36 25,19%
Malasya 8,40 7,79% a 2,18 70,21% 9,27 5,48% a 3,12 53,76% 7,77 10,03% 4,89 29,90% 2,50 64,39% 2,84 58,54%
South Korea 4,34 36,25% 6,84 14,45% 9,84 4,32% * 5,58 23,25% 3,10 54,10% 1,88 75,72% 3,69 44,92% 3,58 46,61%
Argentine 5,19 26,81% 4,93 29,47% 8,65 7,04% a 10,63 3,11% * 4,82 30,65% 3,98 40,89% 3,17 53,06% 3,91 41,77%
Cingapura 6,71 15,19% 2,90 57,44% 3,75 44,05% 8,50 7,48% a 4,13 38,81% 2,39 66,49% 4,39 35,53% 4,86 30,15%
Japan 7,93 9,42% a 3,80 43,34% 4,76 31,24% 2,31 67,85% 3,29 51,07% 7,11 13,02% 1,94 74,65% 5,24 26,39%
United Stetes 1,09 89,54% 2,40 66,20% 5,60 23,09% 4,12 38,96% 0,53 97,08% 6,41 17,08% 2,97 56,36% 3,48 48,04%
a p-value less than 10% and greater than 1%
* p-value less than 5% and greater than 1%.
** p-value less than 1%.
Source: The authors
Country generating the crisis
Do the indicators variables detect signs of misspecification
Japan United States Mexicp Brazil Malaysia South Korea Argentine Cingapura
 
   Table 6, Table 7, Table 8 present the results of evaluating whether the negative 
shocks in one country affected 1) the correlations between this country and the others 
and 2) also the pairwise correlation of the other countries with each other. In the first 
case, this is a necessary part of the direct evaluation of contagion. In the second case, 
                                                 
10    The same procedures were also carried out using the value of 2 standard deviations without a 
substantial alteration in the results. we  evaluate  whether  a  crisis  transmitted  from  country  A  to  country  B  generated 
collateral effects in another country C. By way of example, suppose that a crisis in 
country A could have generated contagion effects in B. This could have led to portfolio 
reallocations,  leading  to  sell  orders  for  shares  in  a  third  country.  In  this  way,  the 
correlation between countries B and C was affected even though the generator of the 
crisis  was  country  A.  The  cited  tables  contain  information  on  these  two  types  of 
phenomena. 
The results suggest that 1) crises generated in the countries of Latin America had 
a strong regional impact, but were propagated weakly to some Asian countries; 2) the 
crises generated in the Asian countries had a strong regional impact, being propagated 
strongly to Latin America. In all cases, the crisis affected the U.S. market. Given that 
the fundamentals were not available for Russia, this country had to be excluded from 
the analysis, even though the period studied includes the Russian crisis, and hence the 
changes in the indices may be portraying the indirect effects of the Russian crisis. It 
follows that part of the contagion detected between the United States and Asia may be 
due to the propagation of the Russian crisis. 
  As a conjecture, the ‘collateral’ effect was more intense in countries with more 
fragile fundamentals. In the case of the Asian crisis, Brazil and Argentina did not escape 
unscathed on account of more fragile fundamentals, in particular, because of a currency 
regime which maintained the exchange rate at a clearly overvalued level, and of poor 
fiscal  fundamentals.  An  attempt  to  explain  why  the  Asian  countries  succeeded  in 
remaining immune to the Latin American crises perhaps lies in the temporal sequence 
of events. The Asian crisis occurred at a time when Brazil and Argentina had extremely 
fragile fundamentals with significant fiscal deficits and currency misalignments. The 
crises in these countries occurred at a point when the Asian countries were undergoing a 
clear recovery and already had more solid fundamentals which made them ‘immune’ to 
contagion. At the same time, this is a conjecture which remains to be demonstrated and 
which cannot be directly extracted from the analysis realised in this study. 
 




Estatística p-valor Estatística p-valor Estatística p-valor
Mexico Brazil 4,28 3,85% * 6,06 1,38% * 6,76 0,93% **
Mexico Malaysia 1,29 25,55% 1,50 22,01% 1,63 20,19%
Mexico South Korea 2,67 10,22% 1,67 19,64% 2,81 9,39%
Mexico Argetina 5,24 2,21% * 6,47 1,10% * 7,71 0,55% **
Mexico Cingapura 1,90 16,78% 1,85 17,40% 3,40 6,50%
Mexico Japan 2,06 15,08% 1,70 19,21% 1,86 17,29%
Mexico United States 7,43 0,64% ** 7,22 0,72% ** 13,58 0,02% **
Brazil Malaysia 1,18 27,72% 1,60 20,61% 1,33 24,82%
Brazil South Korea 1,62 20,28% 1,63 20,13% 1,76 18,52%
Brazil Argetina 6,10 1,35% * 8,75 0,31% ** 9,35 0,22% **
Brazil Cingapura 1,68 19,47% 2,09 14,84% 1,98 15,89%
Brazil Japan 1,85 17,43% 1,88 17,01% 1,68 19,45%
Brazil United States 6,09 1,36% * 12,28 0,05% ** 10,89 0,10% **
Malaysia South Korea 2,23 13,57% 2,55 11,05% 2,83 9,23%
Malaysia Argetina 1,34 24,78% 1,41 23,59% 1,48 22,38%
Malaysia Cingapura 3,93 4,74% * 4,58 3,24% * 4,06 4,40% *
Malaysia Japan 2,53 11,16% 2,90 8,85% 4,82 2,81% *
Malaysia United States 1,55 21,36% 1,94 16,38% 1,98 15,96%
South Korea Argetina 1,43 23,15% 1,31 25,21% 1,32 25,06%
South Korea Cingapura 3,15 7,61% 2,58 10,81% 3,00 8,33%
South Korea Japan 5,13 2,36% * 2,73 9,88% 3,05 8,08%
South Korea United States 2,29 13,05% 1,87 17,11% 1,79 18,09%
Argetina Cingapura 2,26 13,30% 2,09 14,87% 2,45 11,73%
Argetina Japan 2,10 14,77% 1,90 16,81% 1,95 16,30%
Argetina United States 6,64 1,00% ** 7,24 0,71% ** 9,14 0,25% **
Cingapura Japan 3,03 8,19% 2,95 8,57% 3,20 7,37%
Cingapura United States 2,01 15,66% 2,60 10,67% 2,74 9,81%
Japan United States 2,58 10,82% 2,76 9,68% 2,43 11,89%
* p-valor menor que 5% e maior que 1%.




Country generating the crisis
Is conditional correlation constant at crisis point?
Mexico Brazil




Estatística p-valor Estatística p-valor Estatísticap-valor
Mexico Brazil 4,83 2,79% * 5,07 2,43% * 3,83 5,04%
Mexico Malaysia 1,42 23,41% 1,54 21,42% 1,20 27,32%
Mexico South Korea 2,51 11,28% 1,54 21,53% 2,08 14,88%
Mexico Argetina 7,37 0,66% ** 10,31 0,13% ** 3,71 5,41%
Mexico Cingapura 2,13 14,43% 2,56 10,96% 3,91 4,80% *
Mexico Japan 2,81 9,36% 1,95 16,28% 1,47 22,48%
Mexico United States 7,35 0,67% ** 6,62 1,01% * 10,84 0,10% **
Brazil Malaysia 1,88 16,99% 1,70 19,24% 1,30 25,45%
Brazil South Korea 1,93 16,52% 1,68 19,48% 2,38 12,26%
Brazil Argetina 6,75 0,94% ** 2,87 9,04% 5,35 2,07% *
Brazil Cingapura 2,63 10,47% 2,04 15,34% 3,90 4,83% *
Brazil Japan 2,51 11,34% 1,76 18,50% 1,92 16,60%
Brazil United States 7,21 0,72% ** 2,19 13,92% 9,48 0,21% **
Malaysia South Korea 2,27 13,19% 2,90 8,87% 3,76 5,24%
Malaysia Argetina 1,38 23,94% 2,09 14,86% 1,24 26,60%
Malaysia Cingapura 4,81 2,82% * 11,69 0,06% ** 7,02 0,81% **
Malaysia Japan 4,16 4,15% * 4,44 3,51% * 2,73 9,83%
Malaysia United States 1,85 17,37% 2,99 8,39% 1,96 16,20%
South Korea Argetina 1,77 18,35% 1,43 23,25% 1,17 27,87%
South Korea Cingapura 2,98 8,45% 3,73 5,36% 5,35 2,08% *
South Korea Japan 7,19 0,73% ** 4,69 3,03% * 5,46 1,95% *
South Korea United States 1,74 18,70% 2,08 14,90% 2,45 11,78%
Argetina Cingapura 2,19 13,92% 4,28 3,87% * 3,21 7,32%
Argetina Japan 2,14 14,37% 2,11 14,60% 1,40 23,67%
Argetina United States 5,65 1,74% * 5,88 1,53% * 7,57 0,59% **
Cingapura Japan 3,90 4,84% * 6,37 1,16% * 6,40 1,14% *
Cingapura United States 2,69 10,07% 3,20 7,34% 4,35 3,71% *
Japan United States 1,70 19,16% 2,61 10,61% 2,14 14,32%
* p-valor menor que 5% e maior que 1%.




Country generating the crisis









Mexico Brazil 11,68 0,06% ** 5,14 2,34% *
Mexico Malaysia 1,21 27,18% 1,58 20,84%
Mexico South Korea 2,81 9,38% 2,41 12,04%
Mexico Argetina 7,89 0,50% ** 7,54 0,60% **
Mexico Cingapura 1,98 15,98% 2,15 14,27%
Mexico Japan 2,41 12,08% 1,78 18,24%
Mexico United States 7,99 0,47% ** 8,44 0,37% **
Brazil Malaysia 1,40 23,61% 1,29 25,65%
Brazil South Korea 2,24 13,48% 1,63 20,24%
Brazil Argetina 8,01 0,46% ** 8,15 0,43% **
Brazil Cingapura 2,26 13,23% 1,96 16,19%
Brazil Japan 3,27 7,06% 1,87 17,19%
Brazil United States 8,71 0,32% ** 8,70 0,32% **
Malaysia South Korea 3,13 7,67% 1,63 20,14%
Malaysia Argetina 1,54 21,41% 1,47 22,51%
Malaysia Cingapura 7,95 0,48% ** 3,47 6,25%
Malaysia Japan 3,41 6,49% 2,82 9,33%
Malaysia United States 2,91 8,81% 1,70 19,29%
South Korea Argetina 1,53 21,64% 1,03 31,02%
South Korea Cingapura 5,61 1,79% * 2,12 14,55%
South Korea Japan 3,75 5,28% 2,44 11,85%
South Korea United States 2,22 13,63% 1,87 17,15%
Argetina Cingapura 2,59 10,75% 2,58 10,85%
Argetina Japan 1,40 23,69% 1,91 16,74%
Argetina United States 6,30 1,21% * 6,51 1,07% *
Cingapura Japan 3,22 7,28% 2,41 12,09%
Cingapura United States 3,38 6,60% 2,08 14,92%
Japan United States 2,42 11,95% 2,18 13,98%
* p-valor menor que 5% e maior que 1%.
** p-valor menor que 1%.
Source: The authors.
Japan United States
Is conditional correlation constant at crisis point?
Country generating the crisis
Correlation
 
 7  Conclusions: 
In this article, we have sought to test the hypothesis of contagion in the financial 
crises of Latin  America and  Asia. The approach used consists of using  multivariate 
volatility models of the DCC-GARCH family in the version proposed by Engle and 
Sheppard  (2001).  The  estimated  models  were  corrected  for  country-specific 
fundamentals, with the need for correction by fundamentals given by Pesaran and Pick 
(2003).  
  The  results  obtained  in  this  article  show  the  evidence  favourable  to  the 
hypothesis of regional contagion in both Latin America and in Asia. As a rule, there was 
contagion in the Asian crisis to Latin America, but not vice-versa. The United States 
and  Japan played the role of  vectors for contagion, with the  first basically to Latin 
America and the second to both regions. An explanation for the role of these countries 
as contagion  vectors lies  in the strong trade and  financial  links  between the United 
States and Latin America and the very deep trade links between Japan and Asia. 
  A conjecture to explain the vulnerability of Latin America to the financial crises 
lies in its poor economic fundamentals during the period, as well as the existence of a 
phase of transition to greater openness in trade and financial terms, through which Latin 
American countries were passing at the time. 
  As limitations of this work, we may highlight: the impossibility on the basis of 
the instrument used of clearly identifying the countries which generated the crisis. At 
most,  as  a  function  of  the  temporal  sequence  it  is  possible  to  identify  the  wave  of 
propagation  of  the  crises  and  whether  these  imply  some  kind  of  instability  in  the 
propagation mechanism over time. 
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